I was introduced to Karl Deisseroth’s work by the popular podcaster Andrew Huberman who totally gushed over his Stanford colleague’s work. I know zip about neuroscience but Deisseroth’s literary style caught my eye. The very first line of the prologue reads like this:
“In the art of weaving, warp threads are structural, and strong, and anchored at the origin — creating a frame for crossing fibers as the fabric is woven. Projecting across the advancing edge into free space, warp threads bridge the formed past, to the raged present, to the yet featureless future.”
Basically Deisseroth is comparing the human mind to a fabric (cf. Brian Greene characterising the cosmos as fabric too?), and the book is about stories of this mental fabric “fraying in those who are ill — in the minds of ppl for whom the warp is exposed, and raw, and revealing.”
[Note: I don’t even know what a warp thread is ok?! Had to google it!]
Deisseroth’s forte is optogenetics which, in my glib understanding, is about inserting special light-sensitive genes from non-human organisms (called microbial opsins) inside our areas of our brains which can then be stimulated for research, treatment, etc. So if you wanna, say, elicit electrical activity in a certain area of the brain which controls crying, you insert those light-sensitive microbial opsins in that specific area after which you shine a laser inside then — voila — you’ve neurologically reproduced crying.
[I’m sure I’ve butchered the explanation somewhat but, oh well…] the bottom line is scientists like Deisseroth are pioneering neural-manipulators so heads up.
He gives 6 fascinating case studies (more medium to an extended discussion than message by themselves, IMO):
1. A guy who could not cry despite his wife and child dying in a car accident in which he was the driver and only survivor. You’d imagine the greatest tragedies lead to the most tears, but this case-study shows, in fact, that it may block them entirely.
The accident “reduced his dimensionality; even his phrases were flat and colorless. He seemed set aside, set apart in time, sighted in one direction only. When asked about his plans, there was only nothingness, he could not see even a few minutes into the future.” (p.28).
After reporting that subjective value (eg, seeing a loved one die) and external measurables (eg crying) can be added and subtracted!) from brain states, Deisseroth casually notes that little is known in the science of emotional tears.
2. A guy (formerly demure and sedentary) who suddenly developed hyper-manic activity and behaviour. These incl abandoning sleep, being a chatter-box, hyper-sexuality, reading books all night, extreme physical training, etc. — and all after reading a story of a father-and-daughter victim of 9/11.
Deisseroth compared him to Joan of Arc who, when only 17, “emerged into a new way of being, not disorganized but goal-directed, focused on continental politics and military strategy..with a firm conviction that she was essential, and with powerful religiosity that allowed her to infuse the fight with a spirit seen as divine” (p.53).
3. A lady (also a former detainee at Xinjiang) suffering from autism whose brain cannot process the info coming in from the world and, thus, talks non-stop (for reasons I’m glib about, even after reading the chapter). KD presents autism as a form of inability to “process” social interaction, with patients needed a lot of time/energy to figure out meanings, innuendos, intentions, etc.
“The time consciousness requires to take in coalescing is a hundredfold slower than the electrical signalling speed of brain cells in isolation…Whenever the world sends us new bits almost a quarter of a second passes before that exquisite glow of conscious awareness shines forth.” (p.67). Therefore, “society in general — dominated by vagaries of human behaviour — can be a mystery, even a minefield, for autism patients” (p.76)
4. A guy with borderline personality disorder (who also told medics he wants to eat people) who cut himself because intense negativity which can be controlled was preferably to negativity which was unpredictable. Deisseroth uses this case to discuss the relation between skin and the boundaries of the self.
5. A woman with schizophrenia who built herself a Faraday Cage to prevent her neighbour from downloading her thoughts. I thought Deisseroth presented one of the best definitions of schizophrenia, the essence of which he labelled a “receptivity towards the improbable” (p.16).
6. A girl with bulimia, a condition which “brings crazily exciting rewards, binge and purge, and binge again.” (p.162).
In contrast, anorexia is about “asserting independence from a survival desire, reframing the drive to eat as an enemy arising from outside the self” (p.161–162).
The point is mental sickness or anomalies can and do present narratives of their own. Humbling to see experts like Deisseroth taking in all these stories, refusing to judge or condemn any (even when the schizoid lady suggests that everyone should experience a breakdown in reality at times, p.150) whilst integrating them all part of his practice cum philosophy.
Unsurprisingly, thus, the book didn’t present too many “cures” for these psychiatric cases. Seems like Deisseroth wanted to present said case-problems and discuss them in the light of neuroscience, evolution, literature etc. If nothing else, it’s sobering to be reminded that there are some ppl out there suffering in a manner we (literally) cannot even imagine. Who knows, perhaps we should all accept that some people simply cannot exist as others wish (p.162)?
